Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Forces: A. In physics, a force is an influence that can change an object's velocity, i.e., to accelerate. Forces are vector quantities, meaning they have both magnitude and direction. - B. In philosophy the discussion ist often about the assertive force. Gottlob Frege argued that assertive force is an essential part of the meaning of a sentence, but that it is distinct from the truth conditions of the sentence. The truth conditions of a sentence determine whether it is true or false, while the assertive force determines what the speaker is doing by uttering the sentence. See also Truth conditions, Meaning, Assertions, Speech acts._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Leopold von Ranke on Forces - Dictionary of Arguments
Gadamer I 208 Force/Freedom/History/Ranke/Gadamer: "Let us admit that history can never have the unity of a philosophical system; but without inner coherence it is not. Before us we see a series of successive events that are interdependent. When I say "interdependent", of course, I do not mean by absolute necessity. (...) but freedom is joined by force, and that is original force; without it, that force ceases to exist in world events as well as in the field of ideas. At any moment something new can begin again, which can only be traced back to the first and common source of all human activity; nothing is there entirely for the sake of the other; neither is entirely absorbed in the other's reality. But there is also a deep and intimate connection, from which no one is completely independent, which penetrates into everything.(1) Gadamer I 209 Gadamer: Power is obviously the central category of the historical view of the world. As such it has already claimed Herder when it was a matter of freeing oneself from the progress scheme of the Enlightenment and in particular to overcome the concept of reason on which it is based(2). >Enlightenment/Herder, >History/Historism. The concept of force has such a central position within the historical view of the world because in it inwardness and outwardness are set in a peculiar unity of tension. Every force is only in its manifestation. The utterance is not only the appearance of the force, but its reality. Hegel/Gadamer: Hegel was absolutely right when he dialectically unfolded the inner affiliation of force and utterance. In this dialectic, however, lies on the other hand the fact that the force is more than its utterance. Possibility of effect belongs to it par excellence, that is, it is not only the cause of a certain effect, but the ability to evoke such an effect wherever it is triggered. So its way of being is different from that of the effect. >Forces/Hegel. Forces/Plato: Already Plato, in this context, has described the reflexive structure of the Gadamer I 210 dynamis for the first time, thus enabling its transfer to the essence of the soul, which Aristotle did with the doctrine of the dynameis, the capacity of the soul(3). >Plato, >Aristotle. Gadamer: Power is, according to its ontological nature, "inwardness". In this respect it is exactly right when Ranke writes: Ranke: "(...) freedom is accompanied by force". For force, which is more than its utterance, is always already freedom. This is of decisive importance for the historian. He or she knows that everything could have turned out differently. Every acting individual could have acted differently. The force that makes history is not a mechanical moment. In order to exclude this, Ranke explicitly says "original force" and speaks of it as the "first and common source of all human activity"(1) - and according to Ranke, that is freedom. Hegel/Gadamer: Here now the truth of the dialectic of force is shown(4). The resistance that the free force finds is itself out of freedom. The necessity at issue here is the power of the traditional and the counteracting others, which is given to every use of free activity. By excluding many things as impossible, it restricts action to what is possible and open. Necessity is itself out of freedom and is itself conditioned by the freedom that relies on it. Logically, it is a matter of hypothetical necessity (the ex hypotheseös anagkaion), in terms of content a mode of being not of nature but of historical being. What has become is not easy to overturn. 1. Ranke, Weltgeschichte IX, Xlllf. 2. In my paper "Volk und Geschichte im Denken Herders" (1942) (KI. Schr. Ill, S. 101 -117; now in vol. 4 of the Ges. Werke) I have shown that Herder has carried out the transfer of Leibniz' concept of force to the historical world. 3. Plato, Charm. 169a. IVgl. auch „Vorgestalten der Reflexion“ Kl. Schr. Ill, S. 1—13; Bd. 6 der Ges. Werke, S. 116-128. 4. Hegel, Enzyklopädie S 136f., ebenso Phänomenologie (Hoffmeister) S. 105ff.; Logik (Lasson) S. 144ff._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Ranke, Leopold von Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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